The Ram Pradhan committee, that probed the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai, said the administration failed to act on repeated intelligence inputs on possibility of a strike on the Metropolis and the top brass of the police department had failed to provide visible leadership during the crisis, even as it criticised the system of handling ‘alerts’.

In its report tabled in the two Houses of the Maha Rastra Legislature, the Pradhan Committee said that state administration and the government did not take any significant steps to beef up coastal security in spite of receiving as many as six alerts on the likelihood of an attack on Mumbai by the sea route.

The six alerts on the possibility of a sea-borne attack were in addition to the 11 between August 2006 and April 2008 on the possibility of multiple and simultaneous attacks by terrorists, the report said. There had been several intelligence reports that the LeT was making preparations to infiltrate Fidayeen, which the committee describes as commando terrorists, venturing into India by the sea route, it said.

”Yet, the administration neither took steps to beef up security nor had regular interaction with the Coast Guard. This was although the Central Government had notified on September 22, 2003, that the Coast Guard would be the Lead Intelligence Agency for coastal/sea borders,’’ it said.

Proper analysis of the report would have revealed a strong possibility of some major terrorist action in Mumbai, it said, adding that the existing mechanism to make such an overall assessment was inadequate.

The report went into the response by the police to the 26/11 attacks and pointed out ‘total confusion’ in processing of intelligence alerts at the level of the state government and ‘inadequacies’ in the existing mechanism for analysing alerts about possible strikes. The  report  recommended that the Principal Secretary of the Home Department in charge of Law and Order should be designated as the nodal officer to receive and act on intelligence inputs. The panel report cited instances of non-adherence to the Standard Operating Practice during the terror siege.

“It was specifically mentioned (in the intelligence reports) that attacks (were) to take place on three dates, that is on August 20, 2006 (alert dated 07-08-2006), May 24, 2008 (alert dated 19-05-2008) and August 11, 2008 (alert dated 09-08-2008) against certain targets including Taj and Oberoi hotels, which did not happen,” the report said.

The then Commissioner of Police of Mumbai, Hasan Gafoor showed absence of visible and overt leadership during the crisis, and remained at one spot near Trident Hotel throughout the operations, the report said. “For lack of visible command and control at the CP’s office, an impression that the police handled the operation ineffectively, was created in public. Moreover, several senior officers had told that in those three days, the CP did not give any directions nor enquired of ongoing operations. Although the CP kept in touch on wireless and mobile on selective basis, several officers felt that they did not get a feeling that they were part of a team,” The CP should have been in the command centre during the crisis, which would have helped better utilisation of forces and avoid duplication of effort by different units,  The report said.

the committee did not find any serious lapses to act or react on the part of individual officers and policemen of the Mumbai Police. “The war-like attack was beyond the capacity of the Mumbai Police-for that matter, of any police set-up. It had to be tackled by specialised forces, such as the NSG,”

The committee said that Standard Operating Practice (SOP) laid down by the Mumbai Police to handle crisis was not followed during the attacks. “SOP’s that draw upon experience and lessons from the past should not be overlooked during a crisis. If top officers treat SOP’s in such cavalier manner, why have the SOP’s at all,” the committee said.

The SOP lays down that the Joint Commissioner of Police (Law and Order) would head the crisis management command and would be in charge of all control rooms, but the then Commissioner of Police decided to direct the Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime) to be in charge of the operations, the report said, while appreciating the role played by the then Joint CP (Crime) Rakesh Maria.

the report said, that an important lesson of 26/11 was not to tamper with the system on the spur of the moment by taking instinctive decisions.
The committee also expressed dissatisfaction that there was no systematic briefing either by the police or at Mantralaya to the media during the attacks. The CP or a designated spokesman should have performed the task of briefing the media,.